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OPINION OF THE COURT 
                
 
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 
 
 The Secretary of the Interior of the United States 
("Secretary"), the Director of the Office of Surface Mining 
Reclamation and Enforcement ("Director"), and the Pennsylvania 
Department of Environmental Resources ("DER") appeal from the 
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
Pennsylvania Coal Association ("PCA") on its challenge to the 
Secretary's approval of certain amendments to Pennsylvania's 
surface mining regulatory program.  At issue is whether the 
Secretary acted arbitrarily and capriciously in approving 
amendments that eliminate the "willfully and knowingly" scienter 
requirement for imposition of civil penalties on corporate 
officers and that change the appeal procedures by requiring 
alleged violators to perfect an appeal from a compliance order at 
the risk of having their challenge to the fact of violation 
deemed waived.   
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I. 
Facts and Procedural History 
 In 1977, in response to the growing environmental and 
social costs of coal extraction in the United States, Congress 
enacted the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act ("SMCRA"), 
30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993).  Among other 
things, the SMCRA proposed "to establish a nationwide program to 
protect society and the environment from the adverse effects of 
surface coal mining operations."  30 U.S.C. § 1202(a).  By 
establishing nationwide standards governing surface coal mining 
operations, Congress hoped that "the unnecessary degradation of 
land and water resources [would] be avoided as the country makes 
good use of its abundant coal supply."  H. R. Rep. No. 95-218, 
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
593, 595. 
 The SMCRA established the Office of Surface Mining 
Reclamation and Enforcement ("OSM") as a subdivision of the 
Department of the Interior.  30 U.S.C. § 1211(a).  The SMCRA 
empowers the Secretary, acting through the OSM, to administer the 
programs for controlling surface coal mining operations set forth 
in the Act.  Id. § 1211(c). 
 The principal regulatory and enforcement provisions of 
the SMCRA are set forth in Subchapter V of the Act.  See 30 
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1279; see also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 269 (1981).  A permit is 
required before any person or company may engage in surface coal 
mining operations.  See 30 U.S.C. § 1256.  That permit must 
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require the surface coal mining operation to satisfy certain 
environmental protection performance standards.  See id. §§ 1265-
66.  Permittees who violate any permit condition or who violate 
any other provision of Subchapter V may be assessed with civil 
penalties.  Id. § 1268(a).  Permittees who "willfully and 
knowingly" commit such violations may be punished by a fine 
and/or imprisonment.  Id. § 1268(e).   
 Two SMCRA civil penalty provisions are particularly 
relevant to this case.  One provides that when a violation is 
committed by a corporate permittee "any director, officer, or 
agent of such corporation who willfully and knowingly authorized, 
ordered or carried out such violation, failure or refusal shall 
be subject to the same civil penalties" that may be imposed upon 
permittees.  Id. § 1268(f) (emphasis added).  The other deals 
with the opportunity of parties charged with violations by the 
Secretary to challenge the fact of the violation.  Under the 
SMCRA, a party may challenge the Secretary's charge of violation 
either within thirty days of receiving a notice or order charging 
a violation,  see id. § 1275(a)(1), or after a penalty has been 
assessed.  See id. § 1268(c); see also 30 C.F.R. § 845.19. 
 In addition to the provisions for federal enforcement 
of the SMCRA, see 30 U.S.C. § 1254, the statute contains a 
mechanism by which states may "assume exclusive jurisdiction over 
the regulation of surface coal mining and reclamation operations" 
on non-Federal lands within the state.  Id. § 1253(a).  To 
achieve this control, a state must submit to the Secretary a 
proposed program "which demonstrates that such State has the 
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capability of carrying out the provisions of [the SMCRA] and 
meeting its purposes . . . ."  Id.  The proposed state program 
must contain state laws which provide for the regulation of 
surface coal mining and reclamation operations "in accordance 
with the requirements of [the SMCRA]," id. § 1253(a)(1), and 
rules and regulations "consistent with" regulations issued by the 
Secretary under the SMCRA.  Id. § 1253(a)(7).  Section 505(b) of 
the SMCRA provides, however, that "[a]ny provision of any State 
law or regulation . . . which provides for more stringent land 
use and environmental controls and regulations of surface coal 
mining and reclamation operation than do the provisions of this 
chapter or any regulation issued pursuant thereto shall not be 
construed to be inconsistent with this chapter."  Id. § 1255(b) 
(emphasis added).  Moreover, with respect to civil and criminal 
penalty provisions, the SMCRA requires that the state program 
"incorporate penalties no less stringent than those set forth in 
this section, and . . . contain the same or similar procedural 
requirements relating thereto."  Id. § 1268(i) (emphasis added).  
 The Secretary has the authority to promulgate 
regulations establishing procedures and requirements for the 
preparation, submission and approval of state programs.  Id. 
§1251(b).  The criteria established by the Secretary for the 
approval or disapproval of state programs provide, in relevant 
part, that the Secretary shall not approve a proposed state 
program unless the Secretary finds that: 
(a)The program provides for the State to 
carry out the provisions and meet the 
purposes of the Act and this Chapter within 
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the State and that the State's laws and 
regulations are in accordance with the 
provisions of the Act and consistent with the 
requirements of the Chapter. 
 
 (b) The State regulatory authority has the authority 
under State laws and regulations pertaining to 
coal exploration and surface coal mining and 
reclamation operations and the State program 
includes provisions to-- 
 
  . . . . 
 
  (7) Provide for civil and criminal sanctions for 
violations of the State law, regulations and 
conditions of permits and exploration 
approvals including civil and criminal 
penalties in accordance with section 518 [30 
U.S.C. § 1268] of the Act and consistent with 
30 C.F.R. 845, including the same or similar 
procedural requirements; 
 
30 C.F.R. § 732.15. 
 The Secretary has also promulgated regulations 
governing any changes, referred to as "amendments," to an 
approved state program.  See 30 C.F.R. § 732.17.  A state that 
proposes any amendments to the laws or regulations that make up 
the approved state program must submit them for approval to the 
OSM Director.  30 C.F.R. § 732.17(g).  The OSM Director must 
review the proposed amendments with reference to the criteria set 
forth in 30 C.F.R. § 732.15 for the approval or disapproval of 
the state program.  See 30 C.F.R. § 732.17(h)(10). 
 On July 31, 1982, the Secretary approved the 
Pennsylvania regulatory program for surface coal mining and 
reclamation operations.  See 30 C.F.R. Part 938; 47 Fed. Reg. 
33,079 (1982).  The Pennsylvania program is set forth in the 
Pennsylvania Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act 
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("PaSMCRA"), 52 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 1396.1-1396.31 (Supp. 1994), 
and its accompanying regulations, 25 Pa. Code §§ 86.1- 86.242. 
The Pennsylvania program vests the primary authority for 
enforcement of the program with the Pennsylvania DER.  See 52 Pa. 
Stat. Ann. § 1396.4c. 
 On December 18, 1991, Pennsylvania submitted proposed 
program amendments for approval by the Director of the OSM, 
including the three proposed amendments that have been challenged 
by PCA in this lawsuit.  Two of those amendments ("the civil 
liability amendments") would alter the standard for the 
imposition of civil penalties on corporate officers for 
violations of the PaSMCRA by a permittee corporation.  See 25 Pa. 
Code § 86.195(a) (as amended 1993); 25 Pa. Code 86.1 (as amended 
1993).  The third amendment ("the civil appeals amendment") would 
alter the appeal procedure for persons charged with a violation. 
See 25 Pa. Code § 86.202 (as amended 1993). 
 Upon receipt of Pennsylvania's proposed amendments, the 
OSM initiated a public comment period and announced the 
opportunity for a public hearing.  PCA, the principal trade 
association of Pennsylvania's coal producers, forwarded comments 
and, at its request, a public hearing was held on June 30, 1992. 
After receiving assurance from the state that the civil appeals 
amendment was in conformity with state law, the OSM approved each 
of the challenged amendments on April 8, 1993.  See 58 Fed. Reg. 
18,149, 18,152-53, 18,157-58 (1993).  Thereafter, the Secretary 
issued a final order approving the three proposed amendments. See 
30 C.F.R. § 938.15(y). 
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 PCA filed this action on May 25, 1993 seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief to set aside the three 
amendments.  It named as defendants Bruce Babbitt, the Secretary 
of the Department of the Interior, and W. Hord Tipton, who was 
then Acting Director of the OSM.1  The Pennsylvania DER 
intervened as a party defendant in the action. 
 After the parties had filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment, the district court issued an order granting PCA's 
motion for summary judgment on the issue of the Secretary's 
approval of the civil liability amendments, concluding that the 
Secretary's approval was "arbitrary, capricious and inconsistent 
with SMCRA," and enjoined the Secretary and the Director from 
enforcing those amendments.  See Order & Judgment of March 30, 
1994.  The court denied PCA's motion for summary judgment on its 
challenge to the civil appeals amendment.  Id. 
 The parties filed motions to reconsider and to alter or 
amend the district court's judgment.  On July 12, 1994 the 
district court vacated its prior order denying PCA's motion for 
summary judgment regarding the civil appeals amendment, and 
granted PCA's motion, concluding that the Director's approval of 
that amendment was "arbitrary and capricious" because 
inconsistent with the Secretary's own regulations.  The court 
then enjoined the Secretary and the OSM from enforcing the civil 
appeals amendments.  See Order & Judgment of July 12, 1994.  The 
court denied the motions of the Secretary, the OSM Director and 
                     
1Tipton was replaced as the OSM Acting Director by Ann Shields, 
and later by current OSM Director Robert Uram. 
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the Pennsylvania DER to alter and amend its grant of summary 
judgment on the civil liability amendments.  
 The Secretary and the OSM Director (the "federal 
defendants") appeal from the district court's order invalidating 
the Secretary's approval of the civil liability amendments.  The 
Pennsylvania DER ("the State") filed a separate appeal from that 
order and the district court's order invalidating the approval of 
the civil appeals amendment.  The two appeals have been 
consolidated.  We have jurisdiction over the district court's 
grant of summary judgment to PCA pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
II. 
Standard of Review 
 An appellate court reviews the district court's grant 
of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the 
district court.  Beazer East, Inc. v. United States Envtl. 
Protection Agency, Region III, 963 F.2d 603, 606 (3d Cir. 1992). 
This requires that we view the underlying facts and all 
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to 
the party opposing the motion. 
 Judicial review over the Secretary's actions under the 
SMCRA uses the deferential standard applied to administrative 
actions.  The Act provides: 
Any action of the Secretary to approve or 
disapprove a State program . . . pursuant to 
this chapter shall be subject to judicial 
review by the United States District Court 
for the District which includes the capital 
of the State whose program is at issue. . . .  
. . . . 
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Any action subject to judicial review under 
this subsection shall be affirmed unless the 
court concludes that such action is 
arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise 
inconsistent with law. 
 
30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
 In determining whether the Secretary's actions are 
"arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise inconsistent with law," we 
look to the statute to determine "whether Congress has directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue."  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 
(1984).  If the statute is silent or ambiguous, however, courts 
typically defer to the Secretary's reasonable interpretation. See 
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 453, 456 (D.C. Cir. 
1991); see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 ("the question for the 
court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute").  Such deference is particularly 
appropriate when a court reviews the Secretary's interpretation 
of the Secretary's own regulations.  See Udall v. Tallman, 380 
U.S. 1, 16 (1965). 
III. 
Discussion 
A. 
The Civil Liability Amendments 
 The issue between the parties over the civil liability 
amendments to the PaSMCRA is based upon the difference between 
the language in the federal statute governing the imposition of 
civil penalties on corporate officers and the language now in the 
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Pennsylvania regulations.  As noted above, under the federal 
statute the Secretary may assess civil penalties against any 
corporate director, officer or agent who "willfully and knowingly 
authorized, ordered, or carried out such violation, failure or 
refusal . . . ."  30 U.S.C. § 1268(f).  The same standard is 
incorporated in a parallel federal regulation.  See 30 C.F.R. 
§846.12(a).    
 In contrast, with the omission of the "willfully and 
knowingly" language from Pennsylvania's civil liability 
regulation, the DER may assess civil penalties against a 
corporate officer who "participates in a violation or whose 
misconduct or intentional neglect causes or allows a violation." 
See 25 Pa. Code § 86.195(a) (as amended 1993).  The related 
amendment defines "participates" as "[t]o take part in an action 
or to instruct another person or entity to conduct or not to 
conduct an activity."  See 25 Pa. Code § 86.1 (as amended 1993). 
 Neither party elucidates precisely what effect the 
language change eliminating the "willfully and knowingly" 
scienter requirement will have on the standard of proof in a 
particular case.  Arguably it makes the scienter requirement as 
to corporate officers one of general intent rather than specific 
intent.  Inasmuch as PCA's challenge in this suit was only to the 
Secretary's approval of the omission of the "willfully and 
knowingly" language and the district court did not discuss how 
that might apply to a corporate officer's conduct, we leave that 
issue for resolution by a state court or agency in an appropriate 
case. 
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 The district court agreed with PCA that the Secretary's 
approval of Pennsylvania's civil liability amendments was invalid 
under the SMCRA.  The court held that because the Pennsylvania 
Code would now permit the assessment of civil penalties against 
corporate officers who do not act "willfully and knowingly," it 
authorized imposition of individual liability on "a lesser 
standard of proof concerning the individual's intent than in the 
federal law," although "no particular provision of SMCRA or 
federal regulations authorizes a state to vary the standard of 
individual liability."  Memorandum of Decision, March 30, 1994, 
at 16-18.  The district court also found that the omission of the 
"willfully and knowingly" language that is in 30 U.S.C. § 1268(f) 
meant that the Pennsylvania law and regulations do not include 
"all applicable provisions" of the SMCRA and therefore the 
amended civil liability regulations were "defective" under 30 
C.F.R. § 730.5(a).  Id. at 18. 
 The district court cited various provisions of the 
federal statute and regulations which require that state law be 
"consistent with" and "in accordance with" the requirements of 
the SMCRA and regulations issued thereunder.  See, e.g., 30 
U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1) (state law must be "in accordance with the 
requirements of" SMCRA); 30 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(7) (state rules and 
regulations must be "consistent with regulations issued by the 
Secretary"); 30 C.F.R. § 732.15(a) (permitting approval of a 
state program only if, inter alia, the State's laws and 
regulations are "in accordance with the provisions of the Act" 
and "consistent with the requirements of the Chapter"); 30 C.F.R. 
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§ 732.15(b)(7) (requiring that the state program "[p]rovide for 
civil and criminal sanctions for violations of the State law, 
regulations and conditions of permits and exploration approvals 
including civil and criminal penalties in accordance with section 
518 [30 U.S.C. § 1268] of the Act . . . ."). 
  The court acknowledged that section 505(b) of the 
SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1255(b), explicitly permits states to enact 
"more stringent land use and environmental controls and 
regulations," but it read that provision as "only intended to 
allow states to impose more stringent substantive standards on 
coal mining operations," and "not intended to lower the threshold 
of liability."  Memorandum of Decision, March 30, 1994, at 15. It 
therefore believed that section 505(b) of the SMCRA was 
inapplicable. 
 On appeal, the federal defendants contend that the 
district court's construction of section 505(b) was plainly 
incorrect.  They argue that because Pennsylvania's civil 
liability amendments impose a stricter standard of liability for 
individual corporate officers, they are necessarily "more 
stringent land use and environmental controls" authorized by 
section 505(b).  The federal defendants also argue that the 
district court's distinction between "substantive state standards 
on coal mining operations" and the standards for "individual 
liability" is untenable, and note that section 505(b) applies to 
"[a]ny provision of any State law or regulation."  30 U.S.C. 
§1255(b) (emphasis added).  Congress's use of the term "any," 
they reason, permits states to enact any law or regulation which 
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is more stringent than the federal laws or regulations, not 
merely "substantive" land use or environmental control 
provisions. Pennsylvania's more expansive standard for individual 
corporate officer liability is one such form of more stringent 
regulation. 
 The plain language of the statute and our prior 
precedent convince us that the district court's interpretation of 
section 505(b) is too narrow.  That section reflects Congress's 
intent to give the states primary jurisdiction over regulation of 
surface mining, see 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201(f), 1253, as long as the 
states impose laws and regulations that at least meet the minimum 
Federal standards.  H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 102 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 728, 733.  Of 
course, the states may not impose a law or regulation that is 
"inconsistent" with the SMCRA, as section 505(a) makes clear, see 
30 U.S.C. § 1255(a), but section 505(b) clarifies that "more 
stringent" laws or regulations shall not be construed as 
"inconsistent."  Instead, the entire purpose of section 505(b) is 
to ensure that the federal standards act as a floor.  There would 
be no reason to allow the states to impose their own regulations 
if the regulations had to be the same as the federal Act and 
regulations.  That the federal sanction is to serve only as the 
base rather than the ceiling for the state programs is spelled 
out in the SMCRA itself. 
 We see no support in the SMCRA for reading sanctions 
out of section 505(b).  Sanctions for violations are an integral 
element of "land use and environmental controls and regulations." 
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While not determinative, it is relevant that the SMCRA civil 
liability provisions, including the provision imposing individual 
liability on corporate officers, fall within Subchapter V dealing 
with Control of the Environmental Impacts of Surface Coal Mining, 
the Subchapter directed to substantive controls.  The provision 
for the Secretary's approval of state programs requires, inter 
alia, that the state have in place sanctions that "meet the 
minimum requirements of [the SMCRA]."  30 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(2). 
Had Congress contemplated that states could not reach farther 
than the SMCRA in conduct subject to sanction, it hardly would 
have included such a provision. 
 This court previously considered the scope of section 
505(b) of the SMCRA in Budinsky v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Envtl. 
Resources, 819 F.2d 418 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 926 
(1987).  At issue in that case was a Pennsylvania amendment 
requiring a permit for all mining activity, notwithstanding that 
the SMCRA at the time contained an exemption (since repealed) for 
surface mining operations that affect two acres or less. 
Pennsylvania justified its broader permit requirement under 
section 505(b) as a "more stringent" requirement than that 
imposed under the federal law.  On appeal, Budinsky, a coal mine 
operator, argued that section 505(b) applied solely to the 
"procedural, technical and substantive permit application 
requirements" of 30 U.S.C. §§ 1256-1257, and therefore could not 
be construed as allowing the Pennsylvania DER to regulate mining 
operations of less than two acres.  Budinsky, 819 F.2d at 421. 
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We rejected the operator's restrictive interpretation of that 
provision and concluded instead that section 505(b) "manifestly 
pertains to the entire Act, including the two-acre exemption of 
[30 U.S.C.] § 1278(2)."  Id. at 422 (emphasis added).  We stated 
that nothing in the SMCRA "precludes a state from exceeding the 
Act's land use and environmental directives with more stringent 
standards."  Id. at 422-23. 
 The district court in this case attempted to reconcile 
Budinsky with its conclusion that section 505(b) is inapplicable 
here by stating that Budinsky involved "land use and 
environmental controls and regulations."  Memorandum of Decision, 
July 14, 1994, at 13-14.  This conclusory attempt to distinguish 
Budinsky is unpersuasive.  In Budinsky, we plainly stated that 
section 505(b) applies "to the entire Act."  Id. at 422.  Having 
held in Budinsky that 30 U.S.C. § 1255(b) (section 505(b)) 
applies to 30 U.S.C. § 1278, we see no reason not to apply it to 
30 U.S.C. § 1268(f), which contains the individual corporate 
officer liability standard. 
 The district court and PCA both relied on Pennsylvania 
Coal Mining Ass'n v. Watt, 562 F. Supp. 741 (M.D. Pa. 1983), an 
earlier decision by this district judge.  Of course, that opinion 
is not precedential for us.  In any event, it is distinguishable. 
The SMCRA requires that bond hearings be held within thirty days 
after a request for such hearing and that the decision be 
announced within thirty days of the hearing.  See 30 U.S.C. 
§1269.  In contrast, the Pennsylvania program had no time 
requirement for hearings and allowed sixty days from the hearing 
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for announcement of decisions.  The court held in Watt that the 
Pennsylvania program was not "in accordance with" or "consistent 
with" the provision in the SMCRA, and that it was not saved as a 
"more stringent" control or regulation than the federal law 
because, in fact, it was not "more stringent." 
 While we need not decide whether the Watt court 
correctly analyzed the parameters of "stringency,"  we fail to 
see that Watt is applicable here.  The state rule at issue in 
Watt did not impose a "more stringent" land use or environmental 
control than the applicable federal rule, but merely created the 
possibility for delays by the regulatory authorities that federal 
law specifically prohibited.  In this case, by contrast, the 
state liability standard is directed to those who are regulated 
and is inclusive of the federal standard, as no person who is 
liable under the federal law will be able to avoid liability 
under the state standard.  
 Similarly, In re: Permanent Surface Mining Regulation 
Litigation, 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1083 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 1980), 
aff'd in relevant part & rev'd in part, 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 
1813 (D.C. Cir. 1980), on which PCA relies, does not support its 
position.  In suggesting that state programs must incorporate the 
same statutory criteria as those set forth in the federal 
statute, the Permanent Surface Mining court was referring 
specifically to the four criteria set forth in 30 U.S.C. §1268(a) 
to be used in determination of the amount of a penalty to be 
assessed.  See id. at 1089 n.10.  The Permanent Surface Mining 
decision does not suggest that states cannot expand the relevant 
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"statutory criteria" to create a more stringent standard. Rather, 
it holds that the federal law sets forth the minimum criteria 
which must be incorporated into the state programs. 
 We conclude that section 505(b) of the SMCRA applies to 
Pennsylvania's civil liability amendments, and that under that 
section the Pennsylvania civil liability amendments, which impose 
a more stringent standard of individual liability, may not be 
construed as inconsistent.  It follows that the district court 
erred in holding that the Secretary's approval of those 
amendments was invalid. 
     B. 
The Civil Appeals Amendment 
We turn to the State's challenge to the district court's order 
holding arbitrary and capricious the OSM's approval of the civil 
appeals amendment.  In 1988 the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court 
interpreted the PaSMCRA and regulations to permit a party against 
whom the DER assessed a civil penalty to contest the fact of the 
violation when the party challenges the later assessed civil 
penalty.  See Kent Coal Mining Co. v. Commonwealth, 550 A.2d 279, 
283 (Pa. Commw. 1988).  In so holding, the Commonwealth Court 
looked to what it viewed as the unambiguous language in section 
18.4 of the PaSMCRA, 52 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 1396.18d (previously 
codified at 52 Pa. Stat. Ann. §1396.22), and the similar language 
in the comparable regulation in the Pennsylvania Code.  Section 
18.4 of the PaSMCRA provides: "[t]he person or municipality 
charged with the penalty shall then have thirty (30) days to pay 
the proposed penalty in full or, if the person or municipality 
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wishes to contest either the amount of the penalty or the fact of 
the violation, forward the proposed amount to the secretary for 
placement in an escrow account . . . " 52 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 
1396.18d (emphasis added).  Under the regulation: "[t]he person 
charged with the violation may contest the penalty assessment or 
the fact of the violation by filing an appeal with the 
Environmental Hearing Board, including with the appeal an amount 
equal to the assessed penalty--to be held in escrow as provided 
in subsection (b)--within 30 days from receipt of the assessment 
or reassessment."  25 Pa. Code, § 86.202(a) (1988) (emphasis 
added) (amended 1993). 
DER did not include a proposed penalty when it sent a compliance 
order to Kent Coal notifying it of a PaSMCRA violation, and 
apparently DER has a practice of issuing a compliance order in 
advance of assessment of a penalty.  When Kent Coal sought to 
challenge both the violation and the penalty, DER argued that 
under the doctrine of administrative finality Kent Coal's failure 
to appeal the compliance order within thirty days precluded it 
from contesting the fact of violation.  The Kent Coal court 
rejected this argument by reference to the statute and regulation 
quoted above which expressly refer to an appeal on both issues. 
In the proposed amendments submitted to the OSM for approval, 
Pennsylvania modified 25 Pa. Code § 86.202 in two ways: one was a 
modification of subsection (a) so that it now refers only to an 
appeal of a "penalty assessment."  25 Pa. Code §86.202(a) (as 
amended 1993).  The other was to add the following language to 
subsection (d): 
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A person may challenge either the fact of the 
violation or the amount of the penalty once 
an appeal of that issue has been perfected. 
In either challenge, the appellant will be 
bound as to actions of the Department which 
have become final under section 4 of the 
Environmental Hearing Board Act (35 P.S. 
§7514).  A final action includes a compliance 
order which has become final, even though the 
order addresses the same violation for which 
a civil penalty is assessed. 
 
25 Pa. Code § 86.202(d) (as amended 1993).   
 As summarized by the Director of the OSM in granting approval to 
the amendment, this change "would eliminate the chance to appeal 
the fact of the violation at the time of penalty assessment if 
the appeal of the compliance order had not been perfected . . . 
."  58 Fed. Reg. at 18,153.  The details of the procedure are not 
before us but it appears that, under the amended regulation, a 
party seeking to challenge the fact of a PaSMCRA violation must 
perfect an appeal to the Environmental Hearing Board within 30 
days of the compliance order.  See 25 Pa. Code § 21.52; 35 Pa. 
Stat. Ann. § 7514(c).  
After the Secretary ratified the Director's approval of the civil 
appeals amendment, PCA asserted a many-pronged challenge to that 
approval in district court.  The district court rejected PCA's 
contention that the change in the Pennsylvania regulation was 
"inconsistent" with federal law notwithstanding that the SMCRA 
gives parties the opportunity to challenge both the fact of 
violation and the penalty at the same time.  See 30 U.S.C. § 
1268(c).  The court recognized that state programs were required 
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to contain "the same or similar procedural requirements" as those 
available under the federal law, 30 U.S.C. § 1268(i), but held 
that Pennsylvania's amended civil appeals regulation did provide 
"similar," albeit not the "same," procedural rights as those 
available under federal law.  See Memorandum of Decision, March 
30, 1994, at 6.  Notably, the court reasoned that "the amendment 
affects only the timing of an appeal and not the substantive 
matters that can be raised."  Id. at 6-7. 
In the same opinion, the district court rejected PCA's contention 
that the amended regulation conflicts with state law. On 
reconsideration, however, the district court reached a different 
result, noting that its earlier decision had been based on its 
view that the provisions as to procedure in section 18.4 had been 
implicitly repealed because they were inconsistent with a 
subsequently enacted Pennsylvania statute.  Memorandum of 
Decision, July 12, 1994, at 4-5.  The court was now persuaded 
that section 18.4 had not been repealed by implication.  It 
concluded that the amended civil appeals regulation was in 
conflict with the still viable section 18.4 as it had been 
interpreted by Kent Coal.  The district court then held that 
because a statute controls over a regulation, the amended civil 
appeals amendment was invalid under Pennsylvania law.  Id. at 11. 
Continuing its analysis, the district court interpreted the 
federal SMCRA regulations as prohibiting the OSM from approving 
an amendment that was invalid under Pennsylvania state law.  The 
court read 30 C.F.R. § 732.15(b)(7) to require that the OSM 
determine "that Pennsylvania had authority under state law to 
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adopt a provision like new section 86.202."  Memorandum of 
Decision, July 12, 1994 at 9.  Relying on its own conclusion as 
to the invalidity of the amended civil appeals regulation under 
state law, the court held that the OSM's approval of an invalid 
regulation violated the Secretary's own regulation at 30 C.F.R. 
§732.15(b)(7) and was "arbitrary and capricious."  See Memorandum 
of Decision, July 12, 1994 at 11.  It therefore enjoined the 
enforcement of the civil appeals amendment.  
On appeal, the State argues primarily that the district court's 
conclusion rests upon a misinterpretation of 30 C.F.R. 
§732.15(b)(7).  In particular, the State contends that the 
Secretary's (here inclusive of the Director's) obligation under 
that provision is limited to ensuring that the state regulatory 
authority has the "authority" to promulgate appropriate 
regulations under state law, and that the Secretary is not 
required to ensure that every proposed amendment is consistent 
with all other provisions in state law.  If there is a conflict 
with state law, the State argues, that issue is best resolved by 
the Pennsylvania courts. 
The question before us is not whether the district court 
correctly analyzed the intricacy of Pennsylvania administrative 
law but whether the SMCRA regulations mandate that the Secretary 
undertake such an intricate analysis before approving a state 
program or amendment.  The plain language of the regulation 
imposes no duty on the Secretary to ensure that all elements of 
the state program are consistent with state law. Under 30 C.F.R. 
§ 732.15(a) the Secretary must ensure consistency with the 
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relevant provisions of federal law, and the findings relevant 
here were limited to the conclusion that the provisions in the 
amended civil appeals regulation are similar to the SMCRA 
regulations dealing with the procedures for civil penalties.  See 
58 Fed. Reg. at 18,158.  Sections 732.15(b)(7) and (8) require 
only that the Secretary find that the DER "has the authority 
under State law and regulations" to provide for civil and 
criminal sanctions for PaSMCRA violations and to enforce them. 30 
C.F.R. § 732.15(b)(7)-(8).   
PCA correctly notes that during the OSM's review of the civil 
appeals amendment in this case, the Director questioned 
Pennsylvania regarding the consistency of the amendment with 
state law.  During the course of its review of the amendment, 
"OSM expressed concern that this change to section 86.202 would 
render it inconsistent with section 18.4 of PA-SMCRA [52 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1396.18d]."  58 Fed. Reg. at 18,153. 
Pennsylvania satisfied these concerns by providing a letter from 
the Pennsylvania Attorney General approving the proposed 
regulations "in both form and legality."  Id. (emphasis added).  
We are troubled by the Secretary's failure to articulate a 
binding administrative interpretation to clarify the extent of 
the Secretary's duty to inquire into state law, but we decline to 
glean from the OSM's inquiry during the administrative 
proceedings an affirmative obligation on the Secretary to do more 
than was done here.  We have no need here to consider the 
separate question whether the Secretary has the authority to 
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reject proposed amendments to state programs due to their 
inconsistency with state law. 
Finally, apparently as an alternative ground to uphold the 
district court's order, PCA argues that the civil appeals 
amendment is not consistent with federal provisions which permit 
an alleged violator to wait to challenge the fact of violation 
until making a challenge to the penalty that is assessed.  See 30 
U.S.C. § 1268(c); see also 30 C.F.R. § 845.19.  We find no basis 
for PCA's argument.   
 Under 30 U.S.C. § 1268(i), state programs are only required to 
"contain the same or similar procedural requirements" as those 
set forth in the federal statute.  30 U.S.C. § 1268(i) (emphasis 
added); see also 30 C.F.R. § 732.15(b)(7) (requiring, among other 
things, that the state program include "the same or similar 
procedural requirements" for civil and criminal sanctions as 
those contained in 30 U.S.C. § 1268 and 30 C.F.R. § 845).  The 
Director acknowledged that the new PaSMCRA civil appeals 
regulation eliminates an alleged violator's ability to delay its 
appeal of the fact of a violation, but approved the amendment 
because it contains procedures which are "similar to the 
counterpart Federal regulations," see 58 Fed. Reg. at 18,153; see 
also id. at 18,158, a conclusion also reached by the district 
court. 
Because the state civil appeals amendment follows the federal 
procedures in assuring notice and an opportunity to be heard and 
merely restricts the timing of appeals, we agree with the 
Director's conclusion that the procedural requirements of the 
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civil appeals amendment are "similar" to the procedural 
requirements available under the SMCRA, as that term is used in 
30 U.S.C. § 1268(i).  The Director's interpretation of "similar" 
as used in 30 U.S.C. 1268(i) is not unreasonable, nor does it 
violate any clear statutory or regulatory mandate.  It is 
therefore entitled to deference.  See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
Thus, we conclude that the district court erred in holding that 
the Secretary's approval of the civil appeals amendment was 
"arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise inconsistent with law" due 
to what the court viewed as an inconsistency with state law, and 
we cannot affirm the district court's order on the alternative 
grounds advanced by PCA. 
IV. 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, the orders of the district court will 
be reversed with instructions to vacate the injunctions and enter 
summary judgment for the defendants and the intervenor. 
